Meno, by Plato
People in the Dialogue
SOCRATES
MENO
BOY
ANYTUS
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Meno: Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is acquired by teaching
or by practice; or if neither by teaching nor practice, then whether
it comes to man by nature, or in what other way?
Socrates: O Meno, there was a time when the Thessalians were famous
among the other Hellenes only for their riches and their riding; but
now, if I am not mistaken, they are equally famous for their wisdom,
especially at Larisa, which is the native city of your friend Aristippus.
And this is Gorgias' doing; for when he came there, the flower of
the Aleuadae, among them your admirer Aristippus, and the other chiefs
of the Thessalians, fell in love with his wisdom. And he has taught
you the habit of answering questions in a grand and bold style, which
becomes those who know, and is the style in which he himself answers
all comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask him anything. How different
is our lot! my dear Meno. Here at Athens there is a dearth of the
commodity, and all wisdom seems to have emigrated from us to you.
I am certain that if you were to ask any Athenian whether virtue was
natural or acquired, he would laugh in your face, and say: "Stranger,
you have far too good an opinion of me, if you think that I can answer
your question. For I literally do not know what virtue is, and much
less whether it is acquired by teaching or not." And I myself, Meno,
living as I do in this region of poverty, am as poor as the rest of
the world; and I confess with shame that I know literally nothing
about virtue; and when I do not know the "quid" of anything how can
I know the "quale"? How, if I knew nothing at all of Meno, could I
tell if he was fair, or the opposite of fair; rich and noble, or the
reverse of rich and noble? Do you think that I could?
Meno: No, Indeed. But are you in earnest, Socrates, in saying that
you do not know what virtue is? And am I to carry back this report
of you to Thessaly?
Socrates: Not only that, my dear boy, but you may say further that I have
never known of any one else who did, in my judgment.
Meno: Then you have never met Gorgias when he was at Athens?
Socrates: Yes, I have.
Meno: And did you not think that he knew?
Socrates: I have not a good memory, Meno, and therefore I cannot now tell
what I thought of him at the time. And I dare say that he did know,
and that you know what he said: please, therefore, to remind me of
what he said; or, if you would rather, tell me your own view; for
I suspect that you and he think much alike.
Meno: Very true.
Socrates: Then as he is not here, never mind him, and do you tell me: By
the gods, Meno, be generous, and tell me what you say that virtue
is; for I shall be truly delighted to find that I have been mistaken,
and that you and Gorgias do really have this knowledge; although I
have been just saying that I have never found anybody who had.
Meno: There will be no difficulty, Socrates, in answering your question.
Let us take first the virtue of a man-he should know how to administer
the state, and in the administration of it to benefit his friends
and harm his enemies; and he must also be careful not to suffer harm
himself. A woman's virtue, if you wish to know about that, may also
be easily described: her duty is to order her house, and keep what
is indoors, and obey her husband. Every age, every condition of life,
young or old, male or female, bond or free, has a different virtue:
there are virtues numberless, and no lack of definitions of them;
for virtue is relative to the actions and ages of each of us in all
that we do. And the same may be said of vice, Socrates.
Socrates: How fortunate I am, Meno! When I ask you for one virtue, you
present me with a swarm of them, which are in your keeping. Suppose
that I carry on the figure of the swarm, and ask of you, What is the
nature of the bee? and you answer that there are many kinds of bees,
and I reply: But do bees differ as bees, because there are many and
different kinds of them; or are they not rather to be distinguished
by some other quality, as for example beauty, size, or shape? How
would you answer me?
Meno: I should answer that bees do not differ from one another, as
bees.
Socrates: And if I went on to say: That is what I desire to know, Meno;
tell me what is the quality in which they do not differ, but are all
alike;-would you be able to answer?
Meno: I should.
Socrates: And so of the virtues, however many and different they may be,
they have all a common nature which makes them virtues; and on this
he who would answer the question, "What is virtue?" would do well
to have his eye fixed: Do you understand?
Meno: I am beginning to understand; but I do not as yet take hold of
the question as I could wish.
Socrates: When you say, Meno, that there is one virtue of a man, another
of a woman, another of a child, and so on, does this apply only to
virtue, or would you say the same of health, and size, and strength?
Or is the nature of health always the same, whether in man or woman?
Meno: I should say that health is the same, both in man and woman.
Socrates: And is not this true of size and strength? If a woman is strong,
she will be strong by reason of the same form and of the same strength
subsisting in her which there is in the man. I mean to say that strength,
as strength, whether of man or woman, is the same. Is there any difference?
Meno: I think not.
Socrates: And will not virtue, as virtue, be the same, whether in a child
or in a grown-up person, in a woman or in a man?
Meno: I cannot help feeling, Socrates, that this case is different
from the others.
Socrates: But why? Were you not saying that the virtue of a man was to
order a state, and the virtue of a woman was to order a house?
Meno: I did say so.
Socrates: And can either house or state or anything be well ordered without
temperance and without justice?
Meno: Certainly not.
Socrates: Then they who order a state or a house temperately or justly
order them with temperance and justice?
Meno: Certainly.
Socrates: Then both men and women, if they are to be good men and women,
must have the same virtues of temperance and justice?
Meno: True.
Socrates: And can either a young man or an elder one be good, if they are
intemperate and unjust?
Meno: They cannot.
Socrates: They must be temperate and just?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: Then all men are good in the same way, and by participation in
the same virtues?
Meno: Such is the inference.
Socrates: And they surely would not have been good in the same way, unless
their virtue had been the same?
Meno: They would not.
Socrates: Then now that the sameness of all virtue has been proven, try
and remember what you and Gorgias say that virtue is.
Meno: Will you have one definition of them all?
Socrates: That is what I am seeking.
Meno: If you want to have one definition of them all, I know not what
to say, but that virtue is the power of governing mankind.
Socrates: And does this definition of virtue include all virtue? Is virtue
the same in a child and in a slave, Meno? Can the child govern his
father, or the slave his master; and would he who governed be any
longer a slave?
Meno: I think not, Socrates.
Socrates: No, indeed; there would be small reason in that. Yet once more,
fair friend; according to you, virtue is "the power of governing";
but do you not add "justly and not unjustly"?
Meno: Yes, Socrates; I agree there; for justice is virtue.
Socrates: Would you say "virtue," Meno, or "a virtue"?
Meno: What do you mean?
Socrates: I mean as I might say about anything; that a round, for example,
is "a figure" and not simply "figure," and I should adopt this mode
of speaking, because there are other figures.
Meno: Quite right; and that is just what I am saying about virtue-that
there are other virtues as well as justice.
Socrates: What are they? tell me the names of them, as I would tell you
the names of the other figures if you asked me.
Meno: Courage and temperance and wisdom and magnanimity are virtues;
and there are many others.
Socrates: Yes, Meno; and again we are in the same case: in searching after
one virtue we have found many, though not in the same way as before;
but we have been unable to find the common virtue which runs through
them all.
Meno: Why, Socrates, even now I am not able to follow you in the attempt
to get at one common notion of virtue as of other things.
Socrates: No wonder; but I will try to get nearer if I can, for you know
that all things have a common notion. Suppose now that some one asked
you the question which I asked before: Meno, he would say, what is
figure? And if you answered "roundness," he would reply to you, in
my way of speaking, by asking whether you would say that roundness
is "figure" or "a figure"; and you would answer "a figure."
Meno: Certainly.
Socrates: And for this reason-that there are other figures?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And if he proceeded to ask, What other figures are there? you
would have told him.
Meno: I should.
Socrates: And if he similarly asked what colour is, and you answered whiteness,
and the questioner rejoined, Would you say that whiteness is colour
or a colour? you would reply, A colour, because there are other colours
as well.
Meno: I should.
Socrates: And if he had said, Tell me what they are?-you would have told
him of other colours which are colours just as much as whiteness.
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And suppose that he were to pursue the matter in my way, he would
say: Ever and anon we are landed in particulars, but this is not what
I want; tell me then, since you call them by a common name, and say
that they are all figures, even when opposed to one another, what
is that common nature which you designate as figure-which contains
straight as well as round, and is no more one than the other-that
would be your mode of speaking?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And in speaking thus, you do not mean to say that the round is
round any more than straight, or the straight any more straight than
round?
Meno: Certainly not.
Socrates: You only assert that the round figure is not more a figure than
the straight, or the straight than the round?
Meno: Very true.
Socrates: To what then do we give the name of figure? Try and answer. Suppose
that when a person asked you this question either about figure or
colour, you were to reply, Man, I do not understand what you want,
or know what you are saying; he would look rather astonished and say:
Do you not understand that I am looking for the "simile in multis"?
And then he might put the question in another form: Mono, he might
say, what is that "simile in multis" which you call figure, and which
includes not only round and straight figures, but all? Could you not
answer that question, Meno? I wish that you would try; the attempt
will be good practice with a view to the answer about virtue.
Meno: I would rather that you should answer, Socrates.
Socrates: Shall I indulge you?
Meno: By all means.
Socrates: And then you will tell me about virtue?
Meno: I will.
Socrates: Then I must do my best, for there is a prize to be won.
Meno: Certainly.
Socrates: Well, I will try and explain to you what figure is. What do you
say to this answer?-Figure is the only thing which always follows
colour. Will you be satisfied with it, as I am sure that I should
be, if you would let me have a similar definition of virtue?
Meno: But, Socrates, it is such a simple answer.
Socrates: Why simple?
Meno: Because, according to you, figure is that which always follows
colour.
(Socrates: Granted.)
Meno: But if a person were to say that he does not know what colour
is, any more than what figure is-what sort of answer would you have
given him?
Socrates: I should have told him the truth. And if he were a philosopher
of the eristic and antagonistic sort, I should say to him: You have
my answer, and if I am wrong, your business is to take up the argument
and refute me. But if we were friends, and were talking as you and
I are now, I should reply in a milder strain and more in the dialectician's
vein; that is to say, I should not only speak the truth, but I should
make use of premisses which the person interrogated would be willing
to admit. And this is the way in which I shall endeavour to approach
you. You will acknowledge, will you not, that there is such a thing
as an end, or termination, or extremity?-all which words use in the
same sense, although I am aware that Prodicus might draw distinctions
about them: but still you, I am sure, would speak of a thing as ended
or terminated-that is all which I am saying-not anything very difficult.
Meno: Yes, I should; and I believe that I understand your meaning.
Socrates: And you would speak of a surface and also of a solid, as for
example in geometry.
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: Well then, you are now in a condition to understand my definition
of figure. I define figure to be that in which the solid ends; or,
more concisely, the limit of solid.
Meno: And now, Socrates, what is colour?
Socrates: You are outrageous, Meno, in thus plaguing a poor old man to
give you an answer, when you will not take the trouble of remembering
what is Gorgias' definition of virtue.
Meno: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.
Socrates: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he
would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.
Meno: Why do you think so?
Socrates: Why, because you always speak in imperatives: like all beauties
when they are in their prime, you are tyrannical; and also, as I suspect,
you have found out that I have weakness for the fair, and therefore
to humour you I must answer.
Meno: Please do.
Socrates: Would you like me to answer you after the manner of Gorgias,
which is familiar to you?
Meno: I should like nothing better.
Socrates: Do not he and you and Empedocles say that there are certain effluences
of existence?
Meno: Certainly.
Socrates: And passages into which and through which the effluences pass?
Meno: Exactly.
Socrates: And some of the effluences fit into the passages, and some of
them are too small or too large?
Meno: True.
Socrates: And there is such a thing as sight?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And now, as Pindar says, "read my meaning" colour is an effluence
of form, commensurate with sight, and palpable to sense.
Meno: That, Socrates, appears to me to be an admirable answer.
Socrates: Why, yes, because it happens to be one which you have been in
the habit of hearing: and your wit will have discovered, I suspect,
that you may explain in the same way the nature of sound and smell,
and of many other similar phenomena.
Meno: Quite true.
Socrates: The answer, Meno, was in the orthodox solemn vein, and therefore
was more acceptable to you than the other answer about figure.
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And yet, O son of Alexidemus, I cannot help thinking that the
other was the better; and I am sure that you would be of the same
opinion, if you would only stay and be initiated, and were not compelled,
as you said yesterday, to go away before the mysteries.
Meno: But I will stay, Socrates, if you will give me many such answers.
Socrates: Well then, for my own sake as well as for yours, I will do my
very best; but I am afraid that I shall not be able to give you very
many as good: and now, in your turn, you are to fulfil your promise,
and tell me what virtue is in the universal; and do not make a singular
into a plural, as the facetious say of those who break a thing, but
deliver virtue to me whole and sound, and not broken into a number
of pieces: I have given you the pattern.
Meno: Well then, Socrates, virtue, as I take it, is when he, who desires
the honourable, is able to provide it for himself; so the poet says,
and I say too-
Virtue is the desire of things honourable and the power of attaining
them.
Socrates: And does he who desires the honourable also desire the good?
Meno: Certainly.
Socrates: Then are there some who desire the evil and others who desire
the good? Do not all men, my dear sir, desire good?
Meno: I think not.
Socrates: There are some who desire evil?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: Do you mean that they think the evils which they desire, to be
good; or do they know that they are evil and yet desire them?
Meno: Both, I think.
Socrates: And do you really imagine, Meno, that a man knows evils to be
evils and desires them notwithstanding?
Meno: Certainly I do.
Socrates: And desire is of possession?
Meno: Yes, of possession.
Socrates: And does he think that the evils will do good to him who possesses
them, or does he know that they will do him harm?
Meno: There are some who think that the evils will do them good, and
others who know that they will do them harm.
Socrates: And, in your opinion, do those who think that they will do them
good know that they are evils?
Meno: Certainly not.
Socrates: Is it not obvious that those who are ignorant of their nature
do not desire them; but they desire what they suppose to be goods
although they are really evils; and if they are mistaken and suppose
the evils to be good they really desire goods?
Meno: Yes, in that case.
Socrates: Well, and do those who, as you say, desire evils, and think that
evils are hurtful to the possessor of them, know that they will be
hurt by them?
Meno: They must know it.
Socrates: And must they not suppose that those who are hurt are miserable
in proportion to the hurt which is inflicted upon them?
Meno: How can it be otherwise?
Socrates: But are not the miserable ill-fated?
Meno: Yes, indeed.
Socrates: And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated?
Meno: I should say not, Socrates.
Socrates: But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is
no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire
and possession of evil?
Meno: That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody
desires evil.
Socrates: And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire
and power of attaining good?
Meno: Yes, I did say so.
Socrates: But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to
all, and one man is no better than another in that respect?
Meno: True.
Socrates: And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he
must be better in the power of attaining it?
Meno: Exactly.
Socrates: Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be
the power of attaining good?
Meno: I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now
view this matter.
Socrates: Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point
of view; for very likely you may be right:-You affirm virtue to be
the power of attaining goods?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And the goods which mean are such as health and wealth and the
possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the
state-those are what you would call goods?
Meno: Yes, I should include all those.
Socrates: Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the
great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would
you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this
to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust
and dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue?
Meno: Not virtue, Socrates, but vice.
Socrates: Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of
virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without
them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue.
Meno: Why, how can there be virtue without these?
Socrates: And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner
for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be
equally virtue?
Meno: True.
Socrates: Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the
non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice
or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice.
Meno: It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.
Socrates: And were we not saying just now that justice, temperance, and
the like, were each of them a part of virtue?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And so, Meno, this is the way in which you mock me.
Meno: Why do you say that, Socrates?
Socrates: Why, because I asked you to deliver virtue into my hands whole
and unbroken, and I gave you a pattern according to which you were
to frame your answer; and you have forgotten already, and tell me
that virtue is the power of attaining good justly, or with justice;
and justice you acknowledge to be a part of virtue.
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: Then it follows from your own admissions, that virtue is doing
what you do with a part of virtue; for justice and the like are said
by you to be parts of virtue.
Meno: What of that?
Socrates: What of that! Why, did not I ask you to tell me the nature of
virtue as a whole? And you are very far from telling me this; but
declare every action to be virtue which is done with a part of virtue;
as though you had told me and I must already know the whole of virtue,
and this too when frittered away into little pieces. And, therefore,
my dear I fear that I must begin again and repeat the same question:
What is virtue? for otherwise, I can only say, that every action done
with a part of virtue is virtue; what else is the meaning of saying
that every action done with justice is virtue? Ought I not to ask
the question over again; for can any one who does not know virtue
know a part of virtue?
Meno: No; I do not say that he can.
Socrates: Do you remember how, in the example of figure, we rejected any
answer given in terms which were as yet unexplained or unadmitted?
Meno: Yes, Socrates; and we were quite right in doing so.
Socrates: But then, my friend, do not suppose that we can explain to any
one the nature of virtue as a whole through some unexplained portion
of virtue, or anything at all in that fashion; we should only have
to ask over again the old question, What is virtue? Am I not right?
Meno: I believe that you are.
Socrates: Then begin again, and answer me, What, according to you and your
friend Gorgias, is the definition of virtue?
Meno: O Socrates, I used to be told, before I knew you, that you were
always doubting yourself and making others doubt; and now you are
casting your spells over me, and I am simply getting bewitched and
enchanted, and am at my wits' end. And if I may venture to make a
jest upon you, you seem to me both in your appearance and in your
power over others to be very like the flat torpedo fish, who torpifies
those who come near him and touch him, as you have now torpified me,
I think. For my soul and my tongue are really torpid, and I do not
know how to answer you; and though I have been delivered of an infinite
variety of speeches about virtue before now, and to many persons-and
very good ones they were, as I thought-at this moment I cannot even
say what virtue is. And I think that. you are very wise in not voyaging
and going away from home, for if you did in other places as do in
Athens, you would be cast into prison as a magician.
Socrates: You are a rogue, Meno, and had all but caught me.
Meno: What do you mean, Socrates?
Socrates: I can tell why you made a simile about me.
Meno: Why?
Socrates: In order that I might make another simile about you. For I know
that all pretty young gentlemen like to have pretty similes made about
them-as well they may-but I shall not return the compliment. As to
my being a torpedo, if the torpedo is torpid as well as the cause
of torpidity in others, then indeed I am a torpedo, but not otherwise;
for I perplex others, not because I am clear, but because I am utterly
perplexed myself. And now I know not what virtue is, and you seem
to be in the same case, although you did once perhaps know before
you touched me. However, I have no objection to join with you in the
enquiry.
Meno: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not
know? What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you
find what you want, how will you ever know that this is the thing
which you did not know?
Socrates: I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute
you are introducing. You argue that man cannot enquire either about
that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if
he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he
does not know the, very subject about which he is to enquire.
Meno: Well, Socrates, and is not the argument sound?
Socrates: I think not.
Meno: Why not?
Socrates: I will tell you why: I have heard from certain wise men and women
who spoke of things divine that-
Meno: What did they say?
Socrates: They spoke of a glorious truth, as I conceive.
Meno: What was it? and who were they?
Socrates: Some of them were priests and priestesses, who had studied how
they might be able to give a reason of their profession: there, have
been poets also, who spoke of these things by inspiration, like Pindar,
and many others who were inspired. And they say-mark, now, and see
whether their words are true-they say that the soul of man is immortal,
and at one time has an end, which is termed dying, and at another
time is born again, but is never destroyed. And the moral is, that
a man ought to live always in perfect holiness. "For in the ninth
year Persephone sends the souls of those from whom she has received
the penalty of ancient crime back again from beneath into the light
of the sun above, and these are they who become noble kings and mighty
men and great in wisdom and are called saintly heroes in after ages."
The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many
times, rand having seen all things that exist, whether in this world
or in the world below, has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder
that she should be able to call to remembrance all that she ever knew
about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, and
the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting
or as men say learning, out of a single recollection -all the rest,
if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all
learning is but recollection. And therefore we ought not to listen
to this sophistical argument about the impossibility of enquiry: for
it will make us idle; and is sweet only to the sluggard; but the other
saying will make us active and inquisitive. In that confiding, I will
gladly enquire with you into the nature of virtue.
Meno: Yes, Socrates; but what do you mean by saying that we do not
learn, and that what we call learning is only a process of recollection?
Can you teach me how this is?
Socrates: I told you, Meno, just now that you were a rogue, and now you
ask whether I can teach you, when I am saying that there is no teaching,
but only recollection; and thus you imagine that you will involve
me in a contradiction.
Meno: Indeed, Socrates, I protest that I had no such intention. I only
asked the question from habit; but if you can prove to me that what
you say is true, I wish that you would.
Socrates: It will be no easy matter, but I will try to please you to the
utmost of my power. Suppose that you call one of your numerous attendants,
that I may demonstrate on him.
Meno: Certainly. Come hither, Boy:
Socrates: He is Greek, and speaks Greek, does he not?
Meno: Yes, indeed; he was born in the house.
Socrates: Attend now to the questions which I ask him, and observe whether
he learns of me or only remembers.
Meno: I will.
Socrates: Tell me, boy, do you know that a figure like this is a square?
Boy: I do.
Socrates: And you know that a square figure has these four lines equal?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And these lines which I have drawn through the middle of the
square are also equal?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: A square may be of any size?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And if one side of the figure be of two feet, and the other side
be of two feet, how much will the whole be? Let me explain: if in
one direction the space was of two feet, and in other direction of
one foot, the whole would be of two feet taken once?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: But since this side is also of two feet, there are twice two
feet?
Boy: There are.
Socrates: Then the square is of twice two feet?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And how many are twice two feet? count and tell me.
Boy: Four, Socrates.
Socrates: And might there not be another square twice as large as this,
and having like this the lines equal?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And of how many feet will that be?
Boy: Of eight feet.
Socrates: And now try and tell me the length of the line which forms the
side of that double square: this is two feet-what will that be?
Boy: Clearly, Socrates, it will be double.
Socrates: Do you observe, Meno, that I am not teaching the boy anything,
but only asking him questions; and now he fancies that he knows how
long a line is necessary in order to produce a figure of eight square
feet; does he not?
Meno: Yes.
Socrates: And does he really know?
Meno: Certainly not.
Socrates: He only guesses that because the square is double, the line is
double.
Meno: True.
Socrates: Observe him while he recalls the steps in regular order. (To
the Boy) Tell me, boy, do you assert that a double space comes from
a double line? Remember that I am not speaking of an oblong, but of
a figure equal every way, and twice the size of this-that is to say
of eight feet; and I want to know whether you still say that a double
square comes from double line?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: But does not this line become doubled if we add another such
line here?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And four such lines will make a space containing eight feet?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: Let us describe such a figure: Would you not say that this is
the figure of eight feet?
Boy: Yes.
Socrates: And are there not these four divisions in the figure, each of
which is equal to the figure of four feet?
Boy: True.
Socrates: And is not that four times four?
Boy: Certainly.
Socrates: And four times is not double?
Boy: No, indeed.
Socrates: But how much?
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